“The way to revive phenomenology
is not through external rituals of compliance with Husserl’s vocabulary, but by
expanding the concept of intentionality to the point where it covers the
entirety of the things themselves, thereby freeing us from the growing
staleness of the philosophy of human access. (…) Instead of maintaining the
usual focus on categorical intuition, so favoured by disciples of Heidegger, I
propose that we examine the simple Husserlian distinction between act and
matter.” (p23)
Annotation:
Harman (2007) posits that phenomenology can re-establish itself “by expanding the concept of intentionality to the point where it covers the entirety of the things themselves, thereby freeing us from the growing staleness of the philosophy of human access” (p123). Dourish (2001) sees in the Husserlian distinction between act and matter that the manifested intentionality of acting over the matter, of interacting, holds a relationship between the meaning of the interaction and the embodied action of the interaction. O’Neill (2008) concisely reminds that phenomenology offers a philosophy and methodology to reveal what others see as much as possible considering problem of a metaphysical state of being only being existentially experienced.
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